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a Code on Measures to Discourage the Importation of Counterfeit Goods.
It is essential that this code be concluded at an early date during the
upcoming round of GATT negotiations.
6. However, since this code does not address critical intellectual property issues other than trade in counterfeit goods, such as patent and
copyright protection, the upcoming negotiations should also have as an
important goal, the conclusion of a more general intellectual property
code or agreement to deal with broader intellectual property issues.
7. Such a code or agreement could include provisions: (i) improving
minimum levels of protection for intellectual property rights which signatory nations would agree to implement and enforce both internally and
at their borders; (ii) requiring signatories to follow certain rules of behavior
designed to make consideration and promulgation of intellectual property
rules and procedures more equitable, e.g., transparency of rule making
and adequate provisions for notice; and (iii) establishing dispute resolution
and enforcement mechanisms.
8. Consideration of intellectual property issues in the upcoming GATT
negotiations should not supplant existing international intellectual property regimes; rather, it is contemplated that these other regimes will have
an important continuing role to play, particularly in providing necessary
technical expertise, in connection with such a code or agreement.
Conclusion
By means of this recommendation, the American Bar Association can
provide the U.S. government with some of the support it needs to insure
that intellectual property issues are placed on the agenda for the upcoming
round of multilateral trade negotiations.
Respecfully submitted,
Robert S. Rendell
Chairman
December 1986

V. Report on Cayman Islands Treaty
BE IT RESOLVED that the American Bar Association supports ratification by the United States of the Treaty Between the United States of
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America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
concerning the Cayman Islands Relating to Mutual Legal Assistance in
Criminal Matters, signed July 3, 1986.
REPORT
1. The purpose of this report is to analyze the provisions of the U.S.Cayman Islands treaty relating to Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal
Matters, signed at Grand Cayman, Cayman Islands on July 3, 1986. The
treaty has not yet been formally transmitted by the President to the Senate.
A copy of the treaty and an accompanying exchange of diplomatic notes
[are reprinted at 26 I.L.M. 536-52 (1987)].
2. Background: As one newspaper has recently noted, the Cayman
Islands and other Caribbean islands with strict bank secrecy laws have
been viewed for several years as "a thorn in the side of United States
law enforcement officials, who have complained that drug traffickers,
money launderers, and white-collar criminals have been able to hide their
illicit profits in accounts in banks on those islands." New York Times,
Section D, p. 10, Col. 2 (July 4, 1986). For example, one U.S. businessman
organized and supervised the laundering of a $2.7 million kickback fund
through an elaborate network of secret bank accounts in various countries,
including one on the Cayman Islands. United States v. Davis, 767 F.2d
1025 (2d Cir. 1985). When U.S. prosecutors subpoenaed records from the
Cayman Islands bank, the defendant instituted litigation in that country
under its bank secrecy laws preventing the bank from supplying any records for more than a year. Id. at 1032-33.
3. The mutual assistance treaty signed July 3, 1986, was the result of
three years of negotiations between U.S. and Cayman Islands' officials.
Its obvious intent is to balance the U.S. Government's interest in more
effective enforcement of its criminal laws against the Cayman Islands'
desire to maintain its attractiveness to the financial community by protecting investors' privacy.
4. The United States has four mutual assistance treaties currently in
force: with Switzerland, Turkey, the Netherlands, and Italy. A detailed
comparative analysis of the contents of those four treaties was recently
published in The InternationalLawyer, Vol. 19, No. I at pp. 189-223
(Winter 1985). The Cayman Islands treaty is generally similar to these
other treaties. Where it varies in significant degree, the differences are
understandable in light of the treaty's background.
5. Like the earlier mutual assistance treaties, the Cayman Islands treaty
authorizes a wide variety of assistance between the two countries. Specified assistance includes taking of testimony, providing documents and
records, locating persons, executing requests for searches and seizures,
and immobilizing criminally obtained assets (Article 1.2). The treaty leaves
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the list of assistance flexible by permitting under Article 1.2(i) "any other
steps deemed appropriate" by both parties. Cf. Barr v. U.S. Department
of Justice, No. 86 C 2447, slip op. at 3 (E.D. N.Y., filed October 15, 1986)
(assistance under Swiss treaty not limited to specified activities).
6. Also like the earlier treaties, the Cayman Islands treaty does not
create "any right on the part of any private person to obtain, suppress,
or exclude any evidence, or to impede the execution of a request" (Article
1.3). Case law makes clear that signatory states to a treaty may confer
judicially enforceable rights on individuals in the treaty or preclude them
as the states see fit. See United States v. Davis, supra, 767 F.2d at 1030
n.9. Where, as here, no such rights are granted, individuals lack standing
to compel or to challenge activities under the treaty. Id. at 1030.
7. Private parties continue to have available other forms of discovery,
such as letters interrogatory. See Fustok v. Banque PopulaireSuisse, 546
F. Supp. 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). Some concern, however, has been expressed that forcing criminal defendants to utilize the much slower procedures of letters interrogatory, while allowing U.S. law enforcement
agencies to utilize the treaty's quicker provisions, offers the prosecution
an unfair advantage. E.g., 19 InternationalLawyer at 221. Restricting
direct access to the treaty's mechanisms to the party states is an appropriate and efficient structure for a bilateral treaty, particularly one that is
intended to remove a serious block to prosecution of crimes. The current
U.S. practice is apparently for the government to make requests under
mutual legal assistance treaties on behalf of the defense upon a showing
of necessity and where the court so orders. See 19 InternationalLawyer
at 222 n. 181. This approach is acceptable and provides a reasonable balancing of interests between the government and the defendant.
8. The purpose of mutual assistance is restricted under the Cayman
Islands treaty to "the investigation, prosecution, and suppression of criminal offenses" as the latter term is defined in Article 19.3. Article 19.3(a)
employs the principle of dual criminality in defining a "criminal offense"
as any felony that is a crime in both countries; however, Articles 19.3(b)
through (k) list a number of financial and other crimes for which assistance
is authorized without regard to their criminality under Cayman Islands
law. These offenses include racketeering, insider trading, securities fraud,
foreign corrupt practices (such as bribing foreign officials), and failing to
report the international transfer of currency which constitutes the proceeds of a criminal offense.
9. Not surprisingly, in light of the Cayman Islands' history and concerns,
the treaty expressly excludes from the definition of a criminal offense
"any conduct or matter which relates directly or indirectly to the regulation, imposition, calculation or collection of taxes" (Article 3.1). NeverVOL. 21, NO. 4
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theless, the treaty does authorize assistance in prosecuting two types of
tax-related crime: fraud connected with income tax shelters and false
statements on tax returns with respect to unlawful proceeds of other
crimes covered by the treaty. Compare Article 3.1 with Article 19.3(d)
and (e).
10. The Cayman Islands treaty contains special provisions relating to
exclusivity of assistance (Article 17). While acknowledging that assistance
may be granted pursuant to any other applicable "international agreements or arrangements," the treaty prohibits any party from enforcing
any "compulsory measure, including a grand jury subpoena," to obtain
documents unless that party's obligations under the treaty have been
fulfilled (Article 17.1, 17.3). The treaty establishes in certain cases a time
limit of 90 days for the requested party's fulfillment of its obligations
(Article 17.4). Article 17 reflects the parties' unhappy experience in connection with United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384 (1lth
Cir. 1982) ("Nova Scotia I"), and 740 F.2d 817 (11th Cir. 1984) ("Nova
Scotia II"). In that case, U.S. law enforcement officials subpoenaed the
Miami branch of the Bank of Nova Scotia for records of its Cayman Islands
affiliate. When the bank refused to produce the documents, a U.S. district
court levied a $1.8 million fine against the bank, which was later upheld
on appeal.
11. One other provision of the Cayman Islands treaty differs somewhat
from earlier treaties. Pursuant to Article 3.2(c), the requested party may
deny assistance if the request does not "establish that there are reasonable grounds for believing: (i) that the criminal offense specified ...

has

been committed; and (ii) that the information sought relates to the offense. . .

."

Such a provision again is not surprising given the Cayman

Islands' concern for protecting the privacy of investors and for allaying
concerns about opening bank records to mere "fishing expeditions."
12. The Cayman Islands treaty is of significance as a model for mutual
legal assistance treaties with other Caribbean islands with similar bank
secrecy laws. Pursuant to a protocol agreed to upon the signing of the
treaty and made an integral part of the treaty, the terms of the Cayman
Islands treaty may be made applicable in whole or in part to Anguilla,
the British Virgin Islands, Montserrat, and the Turks and Caicos Islands
by Exchange of Notes between the U.S. and the United Kingdom. Similar
treaties are in the process of negotiation with Jamaica and the Bahamas.
Conclusion
The mutual assistance treaty with the Cayman Islands represents a
valuable step in eliminating barriers to effective law enforcement in the
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Caribbean and is consistent with other such treaties previously signed by
the United States. The treaty should be ratified by the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate.
Respectfully submitted,
Robert S. Rendell
Chairman
December 1986
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